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eign markets for U.S. firms and our clients. This pact will result 
in benefits to consumers and businesses in both countries, as well 
as globally. We look forward to continue to work with both this 
committee and the Administration in developing a fair, rules-based 
trading system that enhances U.S. economic competitiveness. 
Thank you very much. 
[The prepared statement of Marc E. Lackritz can be found on 
page 161 in the appendix.] 
Mr. FEENEY. Thank you. 
Mr. Tarullo, please pull that mike close to you so we can hear 
you. 
STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. TARULLO, PROFESSOR, 
GEORGETOWN UNlVERSITYIAW CENTER 
Mr. TARULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Chairman, I am struck by the fact that it is Chile and Singa-
pore we are talking about here. Chile and Singapore have been 
among the most exemplary developing countries in terms of their 
economic policies, their financial policies, and the orthodoxy of 
those policies. The fact that both of those countries, neither of 
which have imposed capital controls on out-flows in recent decades, 
asked that they be allowed to retain some capacity to impose cap-
ital controls in exigent circumstances seems to me a reason why 
this committee and the Congress ought to take a moment and re-
flect upon the import of these capital control provisions as a tem-
plate for future agreements. 
Now, why would Chile and Singapore, as I say, two orthodox ex-
emplary sets of macroeconomic policymakers ask for an exception? 
I think it is because of the cumulative effect of not just the Asia 
crisis, but the Mexico crisis, and what they have observed over the 
last decade in an increasingly globalized and sometimes turbulent 
financial system. They want to retain the capacity, in an emer-
gency, to do something that they otherwise have no intention of 
doing. The International Monetary Fund, which was certainly a 
proponent of full capital account liberalization as recently as seven 
or eight years ago, has just released a very careful study which 
shows how nuanced one has to be in determining when and how 
capital flows are going to be efficient and effective in developing 
economies. 
Why is it that capital flows do not have the effect in a developing 
economy that they do in the United States, where more or less 
untrammeled capital flows are indeed productive? I think it is be-
cause we are in that murky realm which economists call the world 
of second-best. Developing countries do not have deep and liquid 
capital markets, by and large. They do not have well regulated se-
curities markets. They do not, by and large, have sophisticated su-
pervision for their banking systems. For all of these reasons, the 
countries are not able to absorb capital flows, particularly shorter 
term debt flows, in the way that the United States or the United 
Kingdom could. That is the reason why Cuile and Sinttapore want 
this insurance policy, and that is the reason why I think we need 
to pay heed to their policymakers, speaking for themselves and on 
behalf of other developing countries. 
34 
What troubles me about the present template is that it is really 
quite absolutist. It really does not distinguish, as Dr. Henry is try-
ing to do, among different kinds of capital flows. Indeed, I note that 
the investment chapter of the Singapore agreement mentions and 
includes as an "investment" bonds, debentures, other debt instru-
ments and loans. Unlike the NAFI'A, for example, it does not say 
such bonds, debentures, debt instruments and loans of longer than 
three years duration. It is any such bond, debenture, debt instru-
ment or loan. That kind of painting with a broad brur:h seems to 
me not to incorporate the appropriate modesty that we all must 
have in assessing the operation of global financial systems in devel-
oping countries in the wake of all we have seen in the last decade. 
I am concerned that what we are witnessing here is a bit of a 
triumph of economic creed over economic evidence. What I wou!d 
like to see is more of what Dr. Henry and others are doing, of try-
ing to draw distinctions, to see how much we can learn, and then 
through appropriate channels such as the IMF and discussions in 
the G-7, to see if we can come up with a set of sensible nuanced 
standards-standards that are not just based upon the textbook fi-
nance that apply in the United States, but that are based on the 
real operation of capital markefS in the murky second-best world 
of developing countries. 
I do absolutely believe that when the United States enters into 
trade agreements, it ought to be doing so with its self-interest in 
mind. But that self-interest needs to be an enlightened self-inter-
est. By "enlightened" I mean that we promote rules which are 
going to redound to the benefit of all of our trading partners, which 
will produce a more growth-oriented, stable international economy 
in which the exports of the members of the coalitions represented 
by the gentlemen on my flanks today will be able to prosper. I do 
not think we have an interest in some sort of short-term asset 
grab, if it is at the cost of our ability to promote such sensible 
rules. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
[The prepared statement of Daniel K. Tarullo can be found on 
page 177 in the appendix.] 
Mr. FEENEY. Thank you._ 
Mr. Vastine? 
STATEMENT OF J. ROBERT VASTINE, PRESIDENT, COALITION 
OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES 
Mr. VASTINE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am here 
to testify on the commercial advantages of the Singapore and Chile 
agreements, and explain why they should be approved bY,the Con-
gress. 
U.S. financial services companies are committed to trade negotia-
tions to remove barriers to trade and investment. In any form, 
these barriers are very extensive. We would be glad to supplr lists 
by countries of the kinds of barriers our companies face. The mdus-
try's $6.3 billion trade balance in cross-border trade in financial 
services last year would grow if we could remove these barriers. In-
deed, reducing barriers to U.S. services trade is our best hope to 
reduce the chronic goods trade deficit that Congressman Sanders 
has referred to. 
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DANIEL K. Y ARULLO 
BEFORE THE I 
SUBSCOMMI'M'EE ON DOMESTIC ANDJNTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY POLICY, TRADE AND tECHNOLOGY 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPR.f.SENT ATIVES 
Ap.r!I},1003 
Thank you vecy much for your Invitation to testifY todlY. I am cWTCntly a professor 
at Oeorgetown University Law Center. Between J 993 and J 998 I held several economic 
policy POIItIOIU in the United States Oovernment, endln, u Auiltant to the President for 
International Economic Policy. IleStifY today purely in my individual capacity as an 
academic, with no client interelts or representation. 
Let me uy at the outlCt that I tupport the ncgotiltion of bit. len I free trade 
agroemen" witb Chile and Singllpore. llolh have bipani5lin origlnl and bipartillln support. 
Let me .110 Illy at the IIUltet Ihllt I do nllt come befolc the Subcommittee 11$ an advocate of 
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compromiS«i, but I doubt their views have chaliged. Of course, the Administration was 
attempting in these negotiations to create a "template" (or future negotiations, importantly 
including the proposed regional trade agreements in this hemisphere. Thus I believe the 
Congress should send a strong message to the Administration: Such provisions are 
inappropriate in any agreement and may do substantial harm to both U.S. and emerging 
market interests in agreements with countries that arc nOI as financially sophisticated as 
Singapore or Chile. 
TIt. Tenuous Case/or International FinllncJllllnugrlltWn 
The Administration has publicly defended its position in the Singapore and Chile 
negotiations by asserting the benefits of liberalized capital flows. It has invoked well-
known lheoretical arguments such as the increased mobilization of capital that occurs from 
the deepening of capital markets and the economic stabilization that comes from more 
efficient risk-spreading. These are appealing arguments and, in the context of a deep and 
well-regulated capital market such as the United States, convincing as well. The problem, 
thouSh, i, that in the wnlext o( developing conntries, the evidence that these salutary 
effect~ (.ceUI i~ rl( from well-established. 
Jult a few w«kI 1110, the International Monetary Fund published an extensive review 
of Iht OOOfIOmic Illerature on I~ effeclS of financial globaliulion on developing countries. 
'I he 'tudy wu flulncoo, and ils author, WCfe careful not to jump 10 conclusion, on the 
h,,11 of thoir policy prroilrxultions. On the emlra! point, though, the study'S ooncluJion 
w ... UlleljUIVIJClI. A relr-minded rc:viewer of the exilting evidence limply cannot assert 
11i~1 alolllil (llIlnda' Inttllfllion PWIIIOIU N'ltllilklnl ewnomic IVI,wth in developing 
2 
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countries. The fact that the International Monetary Fund was the source of this paper 
mates this cont'tusion even more significant It was not so long ago that the Fwd was 
preaching t'Je virtues of more or less complete capital account liberalization for everyone. 
The financial crises of the 1990s led many at the Fund to reexamine its policies and the 
premises on which those policies were based. 
Note that this conclusion contrasts markedlywith the overwhelming, thougb not 
unanimous, conclusion of empiricalltUdies that trade integration does help to promote 
economic growth in developing countries; It is also important to note some potential 
explanations for why financial integration docs not have a similar, demonstrable effect 
Most of these explanations revolve around the relatively undeveloped character of legal 
and market institutions in emerging markets. That is, financial integratlrm and increased 
capital flows may yield the hoped-for economic benefits only where the capital can be 
channeled efficiently within a developing country. Forcing capital in before the necessary 
institutions are in place may, the evidence suggests, have little positive effect on overall 
growth prospects. 
We are, in other words, in that murky world of second best. The theoretical 
advantages of unregulated capital flows appear to be realized only where other important 
conditions obtain. Where they do not - as is often the case in most emerging markets - the 
benefits may simply not be forthcoming. Surely most countries will want to develop 
financial markets that will eventually allow them to realize the benefits of unimpeded 
capital flows more readily observed in highly developed finMCiai markets. But the 
sequencing of steps that will most readily achieve this desirable end is tir from c1esr. 
3 
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As the recent IMF study and other reviews make clear, the ambiguity and 
inconclusiveness of tile present evidence does not mean that the case will never be made 
for the growth-albancing character offrec capital flows. Indeed, there is already. much 
stronger body of evidence for the benefits of foreign direct investment (15 opposed to 
portfolio investments such IS stocks and bonds) for economic growth. And there have been 
a few studies purporting to find a positive correlation between financial integration and 
growth. But most do not At this juncture. at least, an assertion that global financial 
integration promotes economic development for most emerging market countries must be 
attributed more to economic creed than to economic evidence. 
TI" p()tMtiJzI/Ol' EctJ"omic Disruption 
If the positive economic case for requiring full capital liberalization CIMOt be 
established, perhaps the Administration's position can be justified on the ground that 
capital flows have at worst a neutral effect. and may sometimes have significant positive 
effects. Unfortunately for this possible justification, there is evidence that the liberalization 
of capital flows can make developing countries more vulnerable to financial crises. Again. 
the reason Is not that capital flows arc bad in principle. Sometimes, though, developing 
countries are not able to absorb increased flows in their relatively embryonic banking 
systems and capital markets in a manner consistent with sound credit standards. 
Moreover, sudden inflows of capital can be used to finance consumption. But - and thls Is 
the most important point - the spigot can be, and is, turned off 15 quicldy as it is turned on. 
Capital from the advanced industrial countries often flows into emerging markets in 
search of higher returns during periods oflow interest rates at horne, or following .. sudden 
4 
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spurt in an emerging market's rate of growth. But it will cease flowing as soon as signs of 
a slowdown or banking problemt emerge, or as investment opportunities at home become 
more attractive. Indeed, knowing that the markets of many developing countries are 
relatively illiquid, investors may quite understandably be quicker to withdraw their 
investments from a developing country marleet than they would disinvest from a developed 
financial market. Herd behavior is a very real phenomenon, and one that is not irrational 
from the standpoint of the investor. 
As foreign short·term capital is withdrawn from the developing country. its curreocy 
can depreciate rapidly, leading in tum to more capital flight. Meanwhile, import prices 
soar, hll'!Ding the country's economy. Once the crisis hits, the developing country has no 
good options. Raising interest rates dramatically may stem the outflow of funds, but at the 
cost of a serious recession. Borrowing mODey from the IMF can help reassure investors 
that they will be repaid. But IMP paclcages are rarely big enough to cover all obligalioDS 
and. of course, they increase the debt of the affected country. 
In such circumstances, the imposition of capital controls may be a viable tool to belp 
stabili7.e a country's currency and give its government some breathing space for financial 
reform. This was the approach taken, with apparent success, by Malaysia during the 1997-
98 global financial crills. Altl!malively, the country mlY design and implement a systerD 
of capital restrictions to forestall sudden inflows or outflows. This was the approach taken 
by Chile itself during the J 9905. There is disagreement among economists as to the 
relative importance and effectivCllcss of ChIle', capital control. compared to its other 
economic policiea. There can be little doubt, however, that Chilean officials believed they 
5 
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-
were taJdng prudent, limited steps within the context of very sound macroeconomic 
policies. 
Capit;l controls can be - and often are - iJI-conccived, poorly implemented, or both. 
Even effective capital controls would not be costless. Some useful investments would be 
prevented or discouraged. There may be opportunities for political favoritism end 
corruption in the administration of the controls. Perhaps even more serious in the longer 
run, capital controls may be used as a means to avoid refonn, rather than to provide 
breathing space within which to implement reforms. Like all policy instruments. the costs 
of proceeding must be mClSW'ed against the benefits and against alternative policy 
approaches. This calculus wili. by definition, vary from case to case. Yet the 
Administration's negotiating position in the Chile and Singapore taIb was that capital 
controls are always bad and should be prohibited by the rules of a bilateral trade agreement 
Indeed, Administration officials have publicly staled this view in on-the-record comments. 
The Administration is repeating the mistalce which the IMF itself made a decade ago. 
At that time there was substantial enthusiasm within the Fund for making full capital 
account liberalization mandatory for all Fund members. This enthusiasm was based on the 
same theoretical advantages clfed today by the Administration. Appropriately, perhaps. the 
. financial crisis broke out in Asia just as the campaign for full capital account liberalization 
was beins accelerated. Fund staff, developing country officials. academic economists and 
others all recognized fairly quickly that large, short-term capital flows can sometimes have 
deleterious effects In relatively undeveloped capital marleets. They further recognized that 
these effectJ will be exacerbated in countries pursuing ill-advised macroeconomic policies. 
But requiring full capital liberalization would not then, and will not today, magically make 
6 
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developill8 country capital markets more liquid or bank regulation more effective or 
maaoeconomic policies more sustainable. 
We do nollive in a textbook world, but In that complicated second·best world I 
meutioned earlier, where theoretically beneficial policies may at times do more hann than 
good. Remembec, too, that the textbooks themselves must be rewritten after each major 
financial crisis, which results from a different set of proxima Ie causes and unfolds in a 
different way. The prominence of privately held debt in precipitating the crisis that began 
in Asia in 1997 surprised nearly all government officials, market actors, and academics, 
who had become accustomed to focusing on the sovereign debt and balance of payments 
positions of developing countries. I suspect that the origins of the next widespread crisis 
will also surprise us, even though we will see in retrospect some of the same 
vulnerabilities. One can understand. in such a world. the nervousness of even the most 
orthodox developing connlly officials. One would also think that this is an occasion for 
modesty about our understanding of the effects of capital flows in particular circumstances. 
The desitable aims oftbe United Stales related to developing counlly capital flows 
and policies are, in my view, fairly clear: We should continue to encourage official and 
academic research inlo the effects of capital flow and capital controls in developing 
countries, so !hat empirical work can provide a solid basis for policy. We should, thougb 
multilateral financial Institutions such u the IMF, encourage the adoption of sound 
economic policies and usist the Improvement of banking and capital market regulation In 
developing countries, so that they Wl11 be able to gain the benefits ofliberalizcd capital 
floWi without undue rillt of financial crisis. We should, both directly and through our 
participation in the IMP, warn countries away from reliance on capital controls u a 
7 
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- substitute for polqrefonn and.the strengtbeniDg ofmarlcc:t and regulatory institutions.. _ 
But we should not attempt to impose a policy that penalizes an emerging marlcct country 
beset by financial contagion that adopts temporary capital controls in accordance with the 
best judgment ofils own financial officials following consultatioll$ with the IMF. 
The IIIjlrlllhies oltlle Nqotillted Provisimts 
As has been well reported in the press, the governments of both Chile and Singapore 
resisted the Administrltion's demand ~ a rule in the trade agreements prohibiting the use 
. of capital controls under any circumstances. Singaporean officials, for example, were 
quoted as saying that Singapore needed to "retain flexibility in extreme cases" to use 
controls. Again, we see this concern even on the part of an emerging nwket government 
thai has followed orthodox macroeconomic policies and that did not institute contrc.:s 
during the turbulence of 1997-98. The Administration refused to Igret to an exception 
even for the most extn:me of crises. In the words of an Administration official. "The U.S. 
view is. we're not going to sign on to the notion that capital controls are justified in any 
circumstances." 
The Administration accordingly shifted its strategy and sought the provisions that we 
have in the texts of the agreements. These provisions provide for direct, automatic 
compensation of U.S. investors by Chile or Singapore should one oftbose countries ever 
impose capital controls of any sort. This "solution" compounds the Administration's 
mistake on financial policy by distorting trade policy as well. 
The eareements give any U.S. Investor the right to obtain ~on for any "lOIS 
or damage" arising from the use of capi~ controls. If the control "substantially impedes" 
8 
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transfcn.liability begins to aocruc &om the moment of imposition. If the cxmtrolsdo not 
substantially impede transfers, then damages begin to lCCTUe del' the controls have been in 
place for a year. 
Thus, for example, an investor enjoying the higher yields that come from assuming 
the risk attendant to lending in an emerging market would presumably be able to claim 
damages for the imposition of capital controls if exchange rates moved unfavorably during 
the period of controls. This right exislS even if the IMF approves the control. In a sense, 
then, the investor would be receiving a free insurance policy for its investment Believers 
in the market-efficient internalization of costs by economlc actors might think instead that a 
participant in a financial market should assume the cost of hedging against creditand 
morket risk. 
The investor would have a right to proceed under the so-called investor-slate dispute 
settlement provisions of these agreements. This procedure in essence gives the investor a 
direct cause of action before an international arbitral tribunal, the decision ofwhicb can be 
enforced in directly in the domestic courts of the parties. Members of the Subcommittee 
may recognize this dispute settlement process from the controversies surrounding Chapter 
II of the North American Free Trade Agreanent The arbitral panels that decide such 
cases have generaUy been composed of people with the kinds of backgrounds one finds 
among traditional commercial arbitrators. They will not likely have macroeconomic 
expertise. Indeed, by the terms of the agreements, it does not mattel' how good a reason the 
coW\try had for imposing controls in the fJ1'St place. 
Furthermore, the decision of the arbitral panel is final. It may not be appealed on its 
merits and is subject only to the loosest of constraints by domestic courts for exceeding its 
9 
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jurisdiction. The first decade of experien;:e under Chapter 1 I ~eals that some arbitral 
panels have not hesitated to take a very broad view of the obligations of the government in 
question. Indeed, In response to some of these cases, Ambassador Zoellick and his 
subordinates have appropriately begun tu narrow th,= language in some of the provisions 
which arbitral panels have expansively interpreted. But the fact remains that the arbitral 
panel continues to be, for III intents and purposes, the final decision-maker. 
It is important to correct some misir"lpressions concerning the provisions we are 
discussing today. A number of people with whom I have spoken recently, including some 
from the financial services indust1y, have agreed that an absolute prohibition on capital 
controls is ill-advised. But they are con~oled by what they believe to be mitigating features 
of the agreements as negotiated. Undoubtedly, any qualification on an absolute prohibition 
is an improvement on the Administration's negotiating position. But I fear that some 
observers read too much into the qualifications we find in these agreements. 
One mitigating feature mentioned is I letter from Under Secretary Taylor to 
Singaporean monetary officials which is appended to the text oftbe investment chapter of 
the U.S.-Singapore trade agreement. This letter provides, among other things, a gloss upon 
the meaning of the "substantially impede" language explained earlier. It would be a 
mistake for those favoring retention of sensible discretion by emerging mar\cet finance 
officials to take much comfort from this letter. As a law professor, I must say that it is not 
a model of clear drafting. It leaves ample room for investors' lawyers to argue for damages 
in almost any imaginable case. Moreover, even were the language more clear, it is not 
necessarily I practical limitation on the discretion of an arbitral panel to award damages. 
To Sly in the ab5tract, IS the letter does, that damages must be proven and not speculative 
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is not to Win that a decision-maker will take a witably skeptical view of damage claims. 
The Subcommittee should be very clear that, once these agreements arc approved, the 
arbitral process is largely autonomous from the govemmentJ themselves. Overreaching in 
a particular case cannot easily be rorrec:ted. 
A second key misimpression is that the agreements do not give Investors a right to 
collect damages for capital controls that have been in effect for less than a year. Those 
who believe that there is a role for capital controls, but only controls applied for a relatively 
short period. would be reassured by such a limitation 01\ damagcs. Unfortunately, this is 
not what the agreements say. The agreements do require an investor to walt one year 
before filing an arbitral claim. However, this is not an exclusion for losses arguably 
incurred during that year. The damages begin to accrue from the moment controls are 
imposed. It is only the collection of those damages that is delayed. Because the 
agreements provide for interest to be paid on awards to investors, the only relief this 
provision gives the developing country is that it need not pay the compensation 
immediately. 
It is true that the agreements exclude recovery oflosses resulting controls that do not 
"substantially impede" transfers. But this provision just returns us to the uncertalnty 
surrounding the meaning of "substantially impede." The g10sscs in UDder Secretary 
Taylor's letter and press comments by an Administration official suggest that any measures 
of sufficient robustness to help an emttgil18 marlc:et though. financial aisis would, in the 
Administration's view, "substantially impede" transfers and thus be subject to 
compensation claims. 
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____ .-..... . .. Foreign PoIiq.COIlsefIlUlC4S _ .. 
Not only is the Administration's approach to capital controls bad financial policy and 
bad trade policy. It is also bad foreign policy. J would certainly favor a provision that 
guanntced U.S. investors no less favorable treatment than that granted investors from the 
country imposing the capital controls or from third countries. American investors should 
not be singled out for adverse treatment by host countries. But the provisions in the 
agreements require what will likely be more favorable treatment for U.S. invcst'lrs than for 
other investors. domestic or third country. If a country party to one of these agreements 
imposes capital controls. il will have 10 compensate Amaican investors but not others. 
Let us play out the consequences .. A developing country is faced with a severe 
financial crisis. It seeks IMF assistance., raises intCTCSt rates. and imposes temporary 
controls on portfolio capital flows. While the IMF assistance and the controls help to 
stabilize the country's external financial position. they do not prevent a serious recession. 
the usual outcome of emerging mme! financial crises. The country's gross domestic 
product declines significantly. Unemployment and poverty rise. Unless the country is very 
luclcy. these consequences will be felt for years rather than months. 
Then. as the country struggles to emerge from its recession and to repay its debts 
(many of which will have been deferred or rescheduled). U.S. investors file their claims for 
compensation. And, of course. under the bilateral trade agreement they are entitled to that 
compensation. Thus the still-suffering citizens of the country are treated to the prospect of 
U.S. investors being made whole while everyone else bears losses from an economic 
tltaslrOphe that has afflicted the entire nltion. Regardless of what one thinks on the merits 
ofc.1pital controls, one would have to be naIve not to think that an anti-American baclc1ash 
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- .. ---woUJa-result:Iilstead of the United States being perceived as providing leadership to help 
the coW\try back on its feet, we will be perceived as grabbing everything we can while the 
country is Oat on its back. 
This approach is not only It odds with a sensible strategy to maintain the goodwill of 
developing countries towards the United States. It is also at odds with efforts to develop ~ 
set of fair and efficient procedures for the resolution of sovereign debt,problems. The U.S. 
Government would have no authority to defer or reject ~claims of investors. Our 
govenunent would thus be unable to deOect the foreign policy problem of U.S. investors 
suing in international arbitration while other investors are being asked to forbear while an 
approach to a country's debt problems is fashioned. 
There is a great irony hero: Under the version of sovereign debt reslnlcturing 
procedures currently being advocated by the International Monetary Fund, sovereign 
payments could be suspended for a time while debts are rescheduled or written down. 
Many people - myself included - have some questions aoovt these proposals. But a 
nwnber ofpcople who favor a less top heavy. more "market friendly" mechanism for 
sovereign debt restructuring rely upon the possibility of a developing country being able to 
impose temporary capital controls in truly extreme circumstances as part of their 
justification for opposing a world bankruptcy court. That is, they believe that most of the 
time a market-based restructuring negotiation would be adequate, but that on some 
oocasions the imposition of capital controls by the developing country might be necessary 
to allow the process to work smoothly. The Administration position on capital controls 
would, if realized in other agreements, undermine the reserved authority of a developing 
country that could allow a generally less intrusive framework for debt restructuring. It 
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might, thereby. build support for a more activi;;t sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
that would override U.S. and other domestic legal processes. 
Finally, there is another possible foreign policy consequence. As investors from other 
countries realize that U.S. investors are given preferential treatment and insulated from 
losses if capital controls are imposed, they will hive an incentive to channel their 
investments through I U.S. intermediary which qualifies lIS I U.S. investor unckr the 
agreements. After I time, the United States may, for these purposes, resemble an offshore 
financial center that helps investors from other countries evade taxes or money laundering 
regulations or regulatory requirements. A moment's thought IS to bow we in the United 
States hive traditionally regarded such offshore centers will reinforce one's foreign policy 
uneasiness at the prospect of these provisions being exercised. 
Tire Problems wiIIr Templllln 
As earlier noted, the Administration intends the provisions of the Chile and Singapore 
agreements to be a "templale" for future bilateral £lid regional trade agreements. This 
expectation raises two serious ooncems beyond the uncertainties and disadvantages J have 
mentioned in the contexl of Chile and Singapore. 
First, does this intention mean that the Administration will seek to force removal of 
existillg restrictions on capital flows as it negotiates more trade agreements? That is, will il 
seek to obtain the right for U.S. investors to obtain damages for effects from existing 
restrictions. The stated, absolutist view oftbe Administration would suggest an answer in 
the affirmative. As we know, Chile and Sing.pore do nol currently impose controls and 
have no apparent preunt plans to do so. But not all of our potential trade agreement 
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partners are similarly situated. To remove controls rapidly, end without proper- cultivation 
of filWldal and regulatory systems, would be to fly in the ~ of something we sbo' dd 
have by now leamed - that capital account liberaliution, desirable as it may be as an end 
point, needs to be carefully sequenced with the development of appropriate legal, 
coonornic, and marltet institutions to handle the resulting capital flows without undue risk 
of financial crisis. 
Second, if the United States continues to insist on similar provisions in its bilateral 
and regional trade agreements, it will be affecting not just bilateral relations but 
international financial policy as a whole. We will be subverting the authority and influence 
of the International Monetary Fund in an area in which it shows appropriate nuance. We 
will be imposing unilaterally our doctrinaire view offinancial policy. < nd, as illustrated 
by my COIlUllmts concerning debt restructuring proposals, we will have undennincd 
cooperative efforts to fashion a sensible set of crisis prevention and crisis response 
measures. 
Co,;cluslon 
In closing. I went to reiterate that I am not offering a brief for capital controls in 
general or, indeed, in any particular circumstances. I share with others the concern that this 
tool often causes more problems than it solves. But existing empirical work does not allow 
us to say in sweeping tenns that free capital flows are always good for development, or that 
restrictions on capital are always a mistake for a developing country. Current knowledge 
does not permit a broadbrush rule. Even when we learn more, il is possible that an 
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inflexible rule ';ViII nevtt be justified. Instead, presumptions and standards may be the most 
we can with confidence derive from experience. 
The Chile and Singapore agreements do not take account of these subtleties. The 
implications oftbe Administration's absolutist position for international financial policy 
and U.S. foreign policy interests seem not to have been considered. The potential for 
negative effects upon the interests of both the developing world and our own country will 
only grow if such provisions proliferate. The Congress should serve notice to the 
Administration that this is not a template which it wants to see adopted in future 
agreements. 
Thank you very much for your attention. I would be pleased to answer any questions 
• 
you might have. 
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